CALIFORNIA SCHEMING
OPINIÓN
NEW TORK TIMES
27 de Mayo de 2002
Han pasado dos años desde que California sufriera su crisis energética
y desde entonces todavía no se sabe con exactitud las causas
que la provocaron. Con el escándalo de Enron se está creando
un clima de confusión en el cual se entremezclan ambas historias,
y una de las cosas que se saca en conclusión es, que desde su
comienzo la crisis energética californiana ha estado poco investigada
por los organismos correspondientes y ahora están saliendo a
relucir intereses ocultos que van dando algo de luz al caso.
A Washington se le exige una respuesta al por qué, así
como tomar las medidas necesarias para proteger el mercado eléctrico
como un servicio público necesario en el que prime la transparencia
y el derecho de uso frente a las mediaciones de terceros.
TEXTO NEW YORK TIMES
It has been two years since the meltdown in California's energy markets
began. Despite the intense interest generated by Enron's role in the
crisis, however, we still do not have a full accounting of what went
wrong. We need that information. States that may still wish to pursue
the once-bright promise of electricity deregulation will require instruction
on how to avoid California's errors.
Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which are best
positioned to do this job, are preoccupied with Enron's market manipulation.
The danger is that California will be seen as just one part of the Enron
story — the work of one rogue company instead of a complicated mess
created by many different players.
The run-up of California energy costs in 2000 and 2001 bankrupted one
utility, led to rolling blackouts and may yet cost Californians $30
billion in excess electricity charges. In the absence of a full accounting,
people have constructed explanations that advance their own agendas.
Vice President Dick Cheney first blamed the whole thing on the environmentalists,
as well as shortages in natural gas. Gov. Gray Davis blamed the administration
for its reluctance to impose controls on wholesale prices and to investigate
market manipulation. Economists said things would have worked fine had
politicians not meddled with their grand design. What's needed is for
someone to cut through the explanations du jour and get at the truth.
The one thing everyone agrees on is that the power crisis was in large
measure a crisis of underinvestment — a booming state economy undone
by the failure to build the power plants necessary to sustain that boom.
Few plants were built in the 1990's when prices were low. Producers
withheld new investments until they better understood the brave new
era of deregulation — which, as it turned out, nobody understood very
well, least of all California.
In deregulating its power system, the state seems to have made every
mistake possible. For starters, it forced utilities to buy power at
market rates while capping what they could charge their retail customers.
This devastated the utilities. It also sent exactly the wrong signal
to consumers, who had no incentive to conserve. In addition, bedazzled
by the prospect of allowing the free market to set wholesale prices,
California refused to let its utilities sign long-term contracts to
buy power from the generators. The utilities were thus left at the mercy
of an extraordinarily tight spot market that, in turn, was highly vulnerable
to manipulation by the clever lads at Enron.
On top of all that came a perfect storm of unforeseen events that hit
with calamitous force. These included a drought in the Pacific Northwest
that reduced California's hydroelectric power, a rise in the cost of
certain pollution credits and a spike in natural gas prices. Mr. Cheney
was certainly right about that one. What remains unexplained is why
the rise in gas prices was so much higher in California than it was
anywhere else.
Suspicions that some natural gas companies deliberately withheld supplies
in anticipation of still higher prices have never been fully explored.
Nor has the question of why one-third of California's available power
mysteriously went off line in the winter of 2000-2001. Was it because
older plants shut down for repairs? Or was it simply another instance
of power providers gaming the market?
To everyone's great relief, the crisis eventually receded. Federal regulators
summoned the courage to impose price controls, thus reducing incentives
for manipulation. California's politicians summoned the courage to lift
the caps on retail prices, which, together with a vigorous program of
energy conservation, reduced demand. Yet the fact remains that the state
has been badly and perhaps needlessly battered.
It is Washington's duty to find out why, and to devise the necessary
safeguards. Electricity is a public necessity that must be managed wisely,
not entrusted blindly to the market.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/27/opinion/27MON1.html