" When ignored, all realities plot their revenge."
José Ortega y Gasset
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News Links Commentary - Drifting in a
labyrinth
Europe may wander in circles,
lost in its soliloquy, but Bush is beginning to look every bit as much
“yesterday’s man” as Blair, Chirac and Schroeder do. Polls taken by the
Associated Press have Bush’s overall approval rating at 43 percent. 59 percent
think the country is going in the wrong direction and 56 percent disapprove of
his handling of the war in Iraq. The former Republican speaker of the House of
Representatives, Newt Gingrich, told the Washington Post that he sees a lot of
parallels between the restiveness of European voters and their American
counterparts "People feel there is something wrong. Both parties are hurt,
but the governing party is at greater risk." Most significantly, with
congressional elections coming in 2006, the Republican controlled congress only
obtains the approval of 31 percent of those polled.
According to the
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, “A growing number of senior American military
officers in Iraq have concluded that there is no long-term military solution to
the insurgency that has killed thousands of Iraqis and more than 1,300 U.S.
troops during the past two years.” A recent Gallup poll shows that 6 out of 10
Americans think the US should withdraw its troops from Iraq.
Six weeks ago The Sunday
Times, owned by media-magnate and supposedly enthusiastic Bush supporter,
Rupert Murdoch published the leaked minutes of a July 2002 Downing Street
meeting which show that Bush and Blair began their war, not in March 2003, as
most believed, but at the end of August 2002, six weeks before Bush received his
congressional backing, and more than two months before the UN vote. Silenced in the beginning by the US press,
now, thanks mostly to massive Internet coverage, there is in the Time’s words,
“a wave of public awareness sweeping America which is very dangerous for
Bush.”
Isn’t it odd that Rupert
Murdoch’s Times, is playing “deep throat” to Bush’s Nixon? How does this fit with Murdoch’s ownership
of the ‘intellectual author’ of the Iraq war, the neo-con flagship, “Weekly
Standard" or of Fox News TV whose viewers still believe that Saddam
Hussein organized 11-S. I cannot
believe that such confidential information as the Memo, which could do Bush so
much damage, can be repeatedly published in The Times without Murdoch's
approval. Strange as it seems, Murdoch appears to be using his English
newspaper to defenestrate Bush in the USA. David Seaton
·
A good crisis for the EU -
William Pfaff - The International Herald Tribune
·
A new political vision based
on the euro - Wolfgang Munchau - Financial Times
·
The world's hospital -
Timothy Garton Ash - The Guardian
·
Losing Our Country - Paul
Krugman - New York Times
·
Iraq Exit strategy: Civil
war - Asia Times
·
The frontier continent - The
Guardian
·
Oil discovery adds new twist
to Darfur tragedy - Reuters
·
Black Market Organs - Lip
Magazine
·
Home Prices Rise Across the
Global Village - The Wall Street Journal
·
Microsoft China portal bars
talk of 'freedom' - The International Herald Tribune
The United States wants a
Europe that serves as a support for American hegemony: a super stable home of
"coalitions of the willing"; a huge, amorphous, free trade zone,
perhaps even including parts of the Middle East. Paradoxically, in the medium
to long run, the big loser of the European referenda was the USA. DS
Abstract: While it will
be months before the results are fully known, the train wreck of the European
constitutional treaty may have been a very good thing for the European Union.
It has saved it from an open-ended commitment to expansion that could have been
fatal to the EU's own political coherence and to any European expectation of
playing a vigorous and independent future role in international relations.(...)
De Hoop Scheffer told interviewers in Berlin that "the Bush administration
wants to see Europe as a strong partner. It is clear there is no interest in
the U.S. in seeing a Europe that is weakened, less efficient and less
effective." This, though, is true only so long as the European partners
put their forces and resources to work under U.S. leadership, as in NATO's
Afghan security operation and its Iraq officers' training program. The old NATO
that acted in unison on the basis of equality, with political decisions by
consensus has, for practical purposes, ceased to exist since Donald Rumsfeld
announced that the new Washington rule is coalitions for specific
missions.(...) common sense says that the United States is not going to get
what it wants, a submissive European Union. The Europeans are divided on the
issue, of course, but perhaps less than Washington thinks. The
"force" - so to speak - is with the people who want an autonomous
Europe, a counterweight to the United States. This is because they are acting
from the primordial impulse of a society to affirm identity and independence.
Otherwise known as nationalism, this impulse is the one that in France and the
Netherlands defeated an expansion that would put an end to the European
possibility to act independently.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/13/opinion/edpfaff.php
A
good crisis for the EU - The International Herald Tribune
William Pfaff
JUNE 14, 2005
While it will be months
before the results are fully known, the train wreck of the European
constitutional treaty may have been a very good thing for the European Union.
It has saved it from an
open-ended commitment to expansion that could have been fatal to the EU's own
political coherence and to any European expectation of playing a vigorous and
independent future role in international relations.
The EU, expanded eventually
to an association of as many as 35 nations (some of them Muslim), as some have
proposed, could not possibly have had a foreign policy that went much beyond a
collective flinch in reaction to manifest threat. Even with 25 members, the
inhibitions to action are serious.
Therefore, American
benediction of a strong and united Europe, as indicated in Washington in recent
days, and as conveyed to NATO's EU members by Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer following his recent U.S. trip, is a safer endorsement than it would
have seemed before the French and Dutch voted against the constitution.
It comes with a
qualification, reasonably enough, from Washington's point of view. De Hoop
Scheffer told interviewers in Berlin that "the Bush administration wants
to see Europe as a strong partner. It is clear there is no interest in the U.S.
in seeing a Europe that is weakened, less efficient and less effective."
This, though, is true
only so long as the European partners put their forces and resources to work under
U.S. leadership, as in NATO's Afghan security operation and its Iraq officers'
training program. The old NATO that acted in unison on the basis of equality,
with political decisions by consensus has, for practical purposes, ceased to
exist since Donald Rumsfeld announced that the new Washington rule is
coalitions for specific missions.
The French and Dutch
votes against EU expansion, and Tony Blair's suspension of British preparations
for a referendum (which undoubtedly would have produced a "no" vote),
leave little hope for the constitutional treaty. The constitution must be
approved unanimously to be adopted, and even for the European Council to
consider revision of the text and its resubmission to recalcitrant members, 20
of 25 member countries have to have ratified the treaty.
At the moment, two have
rejected it; a third, Luxembourg, may say no even if it still holds its
referendum; Denmark's referendum is likely to be canceled, and the British
referendum never held. In Sweden, until recently counted a safe
"yes," 65 percent of the public wanted a referendum even before the
French and Dutch votes - scarcely a good sign. It takes considerable optimism
to think that this duck is not dead.
If it is dead, then the
United States will not have a Europe that admits Turkey, Ukraine and Georgia,
or that remains open to still other new members in the Middle East and the
ex-Soviet Asian states.
Instead, the United
States, even more than now, may face a divided Europe, functioning on the legal
base of the Nice Treaty. This strengthens Poland in European decision making,
but also Spain.
Tony Blair will be in a
strong position during the second half of 2005, when he will hold the
presidency of the EU, but his own position in Britain remains vulnerable. His influence
in Europe will depend in part on the outcome of the German elections this fall,
and on what happens next in France - and indeed in Iraq, where matters
currently are going badly.
The division within
Europe of most interest to Washington concerns EU military and security
ambitions. Nicholas Burns, the U.S. under secretary of state and a former
ambassador to NATO, bluntly told a NATO conference in Sweden on May 25:
"Let's get it straight. NATO does the big military operations" - or
to be more accurate, U.S.-led coalitions drawn from NATO and elsewhere are
expected to do them.
The EU handles
peacekeeping operations. "If not," he said, "there will be
friction, and you [meaning the Europeans] are not going to be happy."
The chastened European
Union that emerges from the expansion crisis is expected to be one in which the
main European foreign- and security-policy activists, France and Germany, will
be weakened. Gerhard Schröder could be out of office in the autumn. Jacques
Chirac is now politically beleaguered, even if his prime minister is the
Frenchman the Bush administration most loves to hate, Dominique de Villepin.
But despite the threat
from Burns, common sense says that the United States is not going to get what
it wants, a submissive European Union. The Europeans are divided on the issue,
of course, but perhaps less than Washington thinks.
The "force" -
so to speak - is with the people who want an autonomous Europe, a counterweight
to the United States. This is because they are acting from the primordial
impulse of a society to affirm identity and independence.
Otherwise known as
nationalism, this impulse is the one that in France and the Netherlands
defeated an expansion that would put an end to the European possibility to act
independently.
One would imagine that
ultimately the force will prevail.
Here is Plan B. No time to lose. DS
Abstract: As French
foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin already had a Plan B for European
integration two years ago. Last week he repeated his call for a Franco-German
union in his address to the French National Assembly, this time as prime
minister. It is no accident that the idea of a core Europe is coming up now.
When European Union leaders meet at their summit in Brussels this week, they will
be staring at the political void the French and Dutch electorates have left
them: no more enlargement, no more integration, no more liberalisation. All
that is left is the prospect of a row over the British rebate from the EU
budget. This is depressing for a pro-European, unless you shift the parameters.
By rejecting the constitution, the French and Dutch electorates ended political
integration at the level of all 25 EU members for the time being. The only way
for integration to continue now is to move down a level, towards a hard
core.(...) The French and Germans are afraid of the same things - Anglo-Saxon
capitalism, globalisation - but they lack a common positive agenda.(...) (there
is) only one sensible option, a core Europe based on the 12-nation eurozone.
The eurozone has the advantage of functioning institutions - the European
Central Bank or the euro group of finance ministers. In Jean-Claude Juncker,
prime minister of Luxembourg, it has a president. The eurozone also has a
simple and clear common political interest, to succeed economically under the
euro. It is also by far the least discriminatory hard core imaginable. It is
open to every member of the EU. Most important, it badly needs a political
dimension(...) Here is a shortlist of things for a politically integrated
monetary union to do: at the macro level, create a centralised unemployment
insurance fund to shift resources from booming to depressed areas of the
eurozone economy as a part of a stabilisation policy; co-ordinate fiscal policy
beyond the stability pact, the procedures to enforce fiscal discipline; create
a common tax base and, perhaps in the long run, create tax union. At the micro
level, create a eurozone agenda for economic reform with clear priorities for
each country; improve the conditions for cross-border labour mobility by
introducing portable pensions and health insurance, and by introducing
eurozone-wide systems for credit checks, proof of identity and property rental
rules. If you have ever tried to open a bank account in Athens, rent an
apartment in Paris, or obtain a telephone line in Rome, you know what I mean.
EU voters have been saying: do not move to the next stage of political
integration until and unless you fix the projects you have already created.
None needs more fixing than the eurozone. If Europe is looking for a political
vision for the next decade, it need look no further.
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/8065c5f4-dba8-11d9-913a-00000e2511c8.html
A
new political vision based on the euro - Financial Times
By Wolfgang Munchau
June 13 2005
"If
the Europe of 25 fails, what option remains for France? The idea of a
Franco-German approach." (Dominique de Villepin, November 2003)
As French foreign
minister, Dominique de Villepin already had a Plan B for European integration
two years ago. Last week he repeated his call for a Franco-German union in his
address to the French National Assembly, this time as prime minister.
It is no accident that
the idea of a core Europe is coming up now. When European Union leaders meet at
their summit in Brussels this week, they will be staring at the political void
the French and Dutch electorates have left them: no more enlargement, no more
integration, no more liberalisation. All that is left is the prospect of a row
over the British rebate from the EU budget.
This is depressing for
a pro-European, unless you shift the parameters. By rejecting the constitution,
the French and Dutch electorates ended political integration at the level of
all 25 EU members for the time being. The only way for integration to continue
now is to move down a level, towards a hard core.
This raises two
immediate questions: which countries should take part in a core? And what
should such a core do? The concept did not take off in the past because its
proponents tended to have multiple answers to the first question, and none to
the second.
I can think of four
broad scenarios for a core Europe, of which only one can answer both questions
satisfactorily. Mr de Villepin's scenario for a Franco-German union cannot really
answer the second question. The French and Germans are afraid of the same
things - Anglo-Saxon capitalism, globalisation - but they lack a common
positive agenda.
The second option
consists of multiple overlapping cores for each policy area. The legal basis
would be "enhanced co-operation", a procedure first set up in the
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and later extended. There are two problems. The
procedure has not been used before and, coming soon after the No votes, it
would seem a tactic to implement the constitution through the back door.
The third option is a
geographical core, based on the six founding members of the EU. This is the
least sensible option of all, since it would be even more backward-looking than
a Franco-German union.
This leaves only one
sensible option, a core Europe based on the 12-nation eurozone. The eurozone
has the advantage of functioning institutions - the European Central Bank or
the euro group of finance ministers. In Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of
Luxembourg, it has a president.
The eurozone also has a
simple and clear common political interest, to succeed economically under the
euro. It is also by far the least discriminatory hard core imaginable. It is
open to every member of the EU.
Most important, it
badly needs a political dimension, as the recent debate about the future of the
euro has shown. The euro has not brought the promised benefits. Economic growth
is low, unemployment high. Countries are not observing fiscal targets. Monetary
policy is unresponsive. Labour and product markets are not sufficiently
flexible.
Here is a shortlist of
things for a politically integrated monetary union to do: at the macro level,
create a centralised unemployment insurance fund to shift resources from
booming to depressed areas of the eurozone economy as a part of a stabilisation
policy; co-ordinate fiscal policy beyond the stability pact, the procedures to
enforce fiscal discipline; create a common tax base and, perhaps in the long
run, create tax union.
At the micro level,
create a eurozone agenda for economic reform with clear priorities for each
country; improve the conditions for cross-border labour mobility by introducing
portable pensions and health insurance, and by introducing eurozone-wide
systems for credit checks, proof of identity and property rental rules. If you
have ever tried to open a bank account in Athens, rent an apartment in Paris,
or obtain a telephone line in Rome, you know what I mean.
EU voters have been
saying: do not move to the next stage of political integration until and unless
you fix the projects you have already created. None needs more fixing than the
eurozone. If Europe is looking for a political vision for the next decade, it
need look no further.
More beautiful
than any cathedral, any Shakespeare play, any Bach cantata or the Pietá of
Michaelangelo, is the European public
health system and the human values it embodies. This, if nothing else, must be
saved from the "creative destruction" of the "Flat World". DS
Abstract: While the carers
are mainly young and foreign, the patients on this ward are mostly elderly,
white and British. They have old-fashioned English names like Reg, Jack and
Fred. Since the hospital beds are divided only by all-round curtains, you can
hear everyone else's conversations, while they assume they are talking
privately - the perfect set-up for a writer. What I heard, and saw a little
when the curtains were drawn back, was a moving culture of caring.
Old-fashioned terms of endearment rained down upon us: "Here are your
pills, my love", "Come on, sweetheart". Also: love, luvvie,
darling, honey, my tuppence. Spoken in all the accents of the world to Fred, a
white-haired old man who could neither feed nor lift himself. On Fred, well
into Shakespeare's seventh age - sans teeth, sans everything - the greatest
care was lavished. Even bossy Milada found a gentle word for Fred. "Ok,
luvvie," said an English nurse, "this evening it will be Mark,
Chapter Two." As night fell, St Mark's Gospel sounded through the
curtains, read from what Marilyn Monroe once called "that book by Mr
Gideon" - and very loudly, because Fred was also deaf. It was wonderful to
see how they all worked, in their different ways, to give this poor old man the
greatest gift: dignity. So far as I could judge, the medical treatment was
first class. The food was remarkably good, including the Leading Chef dishes,
designed with the help of seven top UK chefs. Nurses told me that pay is slowly
getting better. Only the cleaning seemed to me still very patchy, lagging
somewhat behind the sanitary conditions I recently found in a modest hotel in
Bucharest. But the great thing was this culture of caring.(...) At one point,
in my slightly fevered state, I found myself thinking that it made me proud to
be British - a phrase of such Daily Mail-type blimpdom that I would never use
it while in usual health. But yes, what I saw in this NHS ward made me proud to
be British, in a way that no military victory, no sporting triumph, no
government, monarch or pageant ever did. Proud to be a citizen of a nation that
thinks it worth spending so much of the money we earn to give even the poorest,
oldest man or woman a basic dignity. Proud of those showers of endearments,
which low-paid staff from Trinidad, the Philippines, Zimbabwe and Kurdistan
somehow find it easy to adopt, as a British version of something
universal.(...) With its ageing native-born population, Europe's future is
Fred: an old white man propped-up by immigrant workers and spoon-fed by foreign
carers. One big test for Europe is whether we can display the basic norms of
our society in a way that makes it possible for migrants - whether they are
secular, Christian, Muslim or Chinese - to accept and adopt, because they
connect also to their own. That is something which, on my admittedly brief
observation, the British National Health Service succeeds in doing, with its
culture of caring. More broadly, the NHS represents a historic choice, born of
the confrontation between modern industrial capitalism, on the one hand, and
labour, socialist and communist movements on the other. It's the British
version of a choice for a more humane, democratic version of capitalism that
most European countries have made, in their different ways. Emerging from
hospital, I feel now more than ever that this is the right choice. So the real
question our so-called leaders should be addressing in Brussels today is this:
in a world being completely remade by the fall of barriers to trade and the
economic rise of Asia, how the hell can we still afford to pay for it?
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,5216749-103677,00.html
The
world's hospital - The Guardian
A few days in an NHS
ward show you what we in Europe are struggling to defend
Timothy Garton Ash
June 16, 2005
'It is good to have many
brothers," Tamir, from Iraqi Kurdistan, gravely advises me. "Then if
someone does a bad thing to you, your brother does a bad thing to him."
You mean, for example, kill him? "Yes!" Tamir laughs.
Tamir (I have changed
his name, and most others in this article) is a cleaner in the hospital ward
where I have involuntarily spent the past few days. He is just one from the
legion of different nationalities who have marched past my sickbed - Ugandan,
Czech, Zimbabwean, Trinidadian, Kurdish, Filipino, German, occasionally even
English - in the various liveries of Britain's largest army, the National
Health Service. Making my bed are Xhara from Uganda and Joseph, who, she now
discovers, is from Zimbabwe. The following dialogue ensues across the
bedclothes:
Xhara: "Did you go
to the demonstration against Mugabe driving people out of their houses?"
Joseph (looking
uncomfortable): "No. And you know they were sort of huts not houses. And
from a certain point of view you could say those people were a kind of social disease."
Xhara: "OK, but
they should have built them new houses first."
Joseph: "Ah, it's
all a game of politics."
Xhara: "Yes, we
know politics is a game, but I think you are a Mugabe man! [loud laugh]"
Joseph mutters an
embarrassed half-denial. However, when he comes back to take my blood pressure,
he insists that Mugabe has done much for education (Joseph was a teacher back
home), healthcare and the country's independence. "And if he is a
dictator, then he is still better than Idi Amin!" This would seem to
qualify for a world record in faint praise. But yes, the economy is so rotten,
he and his wife have both come to work in the NHS.
Joseph particularly
approves of the seizure of white farmers' land in Zimbabwe. Next thing, a nurse
with an attractive honey complexion calls at my bedside. I can't quite place
her accent. Where's she from? "Zimbabwe ... you know, Rhodesia." Yes,
her parents were landowners, and yes, they were expropriated. So she, too, came
to work in the NHS. This British hospital begins to feel like the Statue of
Liberty: bring me your poor, your huddled masses, yearning to breath free.
My least favourite
nurse is Milada, a big, bossy woman from the Czech Republic. Even murmuring a
few words in her native Czech barely softens her. Only once do I hear her
really laugh. This is when I ask her opinion of the new Czech president, the
Thatcherite economist Vaclav Klaus. "Klaus," she says, "is an
idiot. A real idiot!" You must imagine this said very loudly, in a Czech accent,
with a short "o" and the sound of two "ts" at the end. Then
a great Slavonic guffaw wakes the old
man in the next bed. Twenty years ago, she would have had great difficulty
coming to work here and, like Joseph, might have hesitated to criticise her
president, even abroad. But now: "Klaus is an idiot!"
While the carers are
mainly young and foreign, the patients on this ward are mostly elderly, white
and British. They have old-fashioned English names like Reg, Jack and Fred.
Since the hospital beds are divided only by all-round curtains, you can hear
everyone else's conversations, while they assume they are talking privately -
the perfect set-up for a writer.
What I heard, and saw a
little when the curtains were drawn back, was a moving culture of caring.
Old-fashioned terms of endearment rained down upon us: "Here are your
pills, my love", "Come on, sweetheart". Also: love, luvvie,
darling, honey, my tuppence. Spoken in all the accents of the world to Fred, a
white-haired old man who could neither feed nor lift himself. On Fred, well
into Shakespeare's seventh age - sans teeth, sans everything - the greatest
care was lavished. Even bossy Milada found a gentle word for Fred. "Ok,
luvvie," said an English nurse, "this evening it will be Mark,
Chapter Two." As night fell, St Mark's Gospel sounded through the
curtains, read from what Marilyn Monroe once called "that book by Mr
Gideon" - and very loudly, because Fred was also deaf. It was wonderful to
see how they all worked, in their different ways, to give this poor old man the
greatest gift: dignity.
So far as I could
judge, the medical treatment was first class. The food was remarkably good,
including the Leading Chef dishes, designed with the help of seven top UK
chefs. Nurses told me that pay is slowly getting better. Only the cleaning
seemed to me still very patchy, lagging somewhat behind the sanitary conditions
I recently found in a modest hotel in Bucharest. But the great thing was this
culture of caring.
At one point, in my
slightly fevered state, I found myself thinking that it made me proud to be
British - a phrase of such Daily Mail-type blimpdom that I would never use it
while in usual health. But yes, what I saw in this NHS ward made me proud to be
British, in a way that no military victory, no sporting triumph, no government,
monarch or pageant ever did. Proud to be a citizen of a nation that thinks it
worth spending so much of the money we earn to give even the poorest, oldest
man or woman a basic dignity. Proud of those showers of endearments, which
low-paid staff from Trinidad, the Philippines, Zimbabwe and Kurdistan somehow
find it easy to adopt, as a British version of something universal.
Suddenly, I found
myself thinking: "Oh heck, people will want me to comment on the EU
summit." Well, you know what, the last thing in the world I want to write
about is that bunch of weary, short-sighted, retread opportunists, laughably
called "European leaders", who are tearing apart a magnificent
project before our very eyes. Sod them (I thought, still in my slightly fevered
state). I want to write about this hospital ward - a far more uplifting
spectacle. And then I realised that in writing about this NHS ward, I would be
writing about Europe after all.
With its ageing
native-born population, Europe's future is Fred: an old white man propped-up by
immigrant workers and spoon-fed by foreign carers. One big test for Europe is
whether we can display the basic norms of our society in a way that makes it
possible for migrants - whether they are secular, Christian, Muslim or Chinese
- to accept and adopt, because they connect also to their own. That is
something which, on my admittedly brief observation, the British National
Health Service succeeds in doing, with its culture of caring.
More broadly, the NHS
represents a historic choice, born of the confrontation between modern
industrial capitalism, on the one hand, and labour, socialist and communist
movements on the other. It's the British version of a choice for a more humane,
democratic version of capitalism that most European countries have made, in
their different ways. Emerging from hospital, I feel now more than ever that
this is the right choice. So the real question our so-called leaders should be
addressing in Brussels today is this: in a world being completely remade by the
fall of barriers to trade and the economic rise of Asia, how the hell can we
still afford to pay for it? We need a better answer than Tamir's.
The "normal"
thing, if left unregulated, is a small group of very rich and a huge mass of
very poor. The modern, mass, middle class society is an artificial
construction... Like hot running water or garbage collection. It makes life
more civilized and "livable" for everyone and ensures tension free,
democratic "normalcy." Weaken or destroy this artificial middle class
and you create a "Bolivia" in what was once a stable, reasonably
happy society. You don't believe me? Read Paul Krugman. DS
Abstract: Baby boomers
like me grew up in a relatively equal society. In the 1960's America was a
place in which very few people were extremely wealthy, many blue-collar workers
earned wages that placed them comfortably in the middle class, and working
families could expect steadily rising living standards and a reasonable degree
of economic security.(...) The middle-class society I grew up in no longer
exists. Working families have seen little if any progress over the past 30
years. Adjusted for inflation, the income of the median family doubled between
1947 and 1973. But it rose only 22 percent from 1973 to 2003, and much of that
gain was the result of wives' entering the paid labor force or working longer
hours, not rising wages.(...) let me just point out that middle-class America
didn't emerge by accident. It was created by what has been called the Great
Compression of incomes that took place during World War II, and sustained for a
generation by social norms that favored equality, strong labor unions and
progressive taxation. Since the 1970's, all of those sustaining forces have
lost their power. Since 1980 in particular, U.S. government policies have
consistently favored the wealthy at the expense of working families - and under
the current administration, that favoritism has become extreme and relentless.
From tax cuts that favor the rich to bankruptcy "reform" that
punishes the unlucky, almost every domestic policy seems intended to accelerate
our march back to the robber baron era.(...) the real reasons to worry about
the explosion of inequality since the 1970's have nothing to do with envy. The
fact is that working families aren't sharing in the economy's growth, and face
growing economic insecurity. And there's good reason to believe that a society
in which most people can reasonably be considered middle class is a better
society - and more likely to be a functioning democracy - than one in which
there are great extremes of wealth and poverty.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/10/opinion/10krugman.html
Losing
Our Country - New York Times
By PAUL KRUGMAN
June 10, 2005
Baby boomers like me
grew up in a relatively equal society. In the 1960's America was a place in
which very few people were extremely wealthy, many blue-collar workers earned
wages that placed them comfortably in the middle class, and working families
could expect steadily rising living standards and a reasonable degree of
economic security.
But as The Times's
series on class in America reminds us, that was another country. The
middle-class society I grew up in no longer exists.
Working families have
seen little if any progress over the past 30 years. Adjusted for inflation, the
income of the median family doubled between 1947 and 1973. But it rose only 22
percent from 1973 to 2003, and much of that gain was the result of wives'
entering the paid labor force or working longer hours, not rising wages.
Meanwhile, economic
security is a thing of the past: year-to-year fluctuations in the incomes of
working families are far larger than they were a generation ago. All it takes
is a bit of bad luck in employment or health to plunge a family that seems solidly
middle-class into poverty.
But the wealthy have
done very well indeed. Since 1973 the average income of the top 1 percent of
Americans has doubled, and the income of the top 0.1 percent has tripled.
Why is this happening?
I'll have more to say on that another day, but for now let me just point out
that middle-class America didn't emerge by accident. It was created by what has
been called the Great Compression of incomes that took place during World War
II, and sustained for a generation by social norms that favored equality,
strong labor unions and progressive taxation. Since the 1970's, all of those
sustaining forces have lost their power.
Since 1980 in
particular, U.S. government policies have consistently favored the wealthy at
the expense of working families - and under the current administration, that
favoritism has become extreme and relentless. From tax cuts that favor the rich
to bankruptcy "reform" that punishes the unlucky, almost every
domestic policy seems intended to accelerate our march back to the robber baron
era.
It's not a pretty
picture - which is why right-wing partisans try so hard to discredit anyone who
tries to explain to the public what's going on.
These partisans rely in
part on obfuscation: shaping, slicing and selectively presenting data in an
attempt to mislead. For example, it's a plain fact that the Bush tax cuts
heavily favor the rich, especially those who derive most of their income from
inherited wealth. Yet this year's Economic Report of the President, in a bravura
demonstration of how to lie with statistics, claimed that the cuts
"increased the overall progressivity of the federal tax system."
The partisans also rely
in part on scare tactics, insisting that any attempt to limit inequality would
undermine economic incentives and reduce all of us to shared misery. That claim
ignores the fact of U.S. economic success after World War II. It also ignores
the lesson we should have learned from recent corporate scandals: sometimes the
prospect of great wealth for those who succeed provides an incentive not for
high performance, but for fraud.
Above all, the
partisans engage in name-calling. To suggest that sustaining programs like
Social Security, which protects working Americans from economic risk, should
have priority over tax cuts for the rich is to practice "class
warfare." To show concern over the growing inequality is to engage in the
"politics of envy."
But the real reasons to
worry about the explosion of inequality since the 1970's have nothing to do
with envy. The fact is that working families aren't sharing in the economy's
growth, and face growing economic insecurity. And there's good reason to
believe that a society in which most people can reasonably be considered middle
class is a better society - and more likely to be a functioning democracy -
than one in which there are great extremes of wealth and poverty.
Reversing the rise in
inequality and economic insecurity won't be easy: the middle-class society we
have lost emerged only after the country was shaken by depression and war. But
we can make a start by calling attention to the politicians who systematically
make things worse in catering to their contributors. Never mind that straw man,
the politics of envy. Let's try to do something about the politics of greed.
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"A few months ago
the Bush administration had reason to hope that a spring of freedom might be
beginning in the Middle East. What's occurring, however, looks more like a
stagnant summer." - Washington Post Editorial.
Abstract: As Shi'ites and
Kurds fought for three months to come up with an Iraqi cabinet, it is emerging
from Baghdad that soon a broad front will emerge on the political scene
composed of politicians, religious leaders, clan and tribal sheikhs - basically
Sunni but with Shi'ite participation - with a single-minded agenda: the end of
the US-led occupation. This front will include, among others, what we have
termed the Sinn Fein component of the resistance, the powerful Sunni
Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) and the Sadrists. It will refuse any kind
of dialogue with new Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari and his government unless
there's a definite timetable for the complete withdrawal of the occupation
forces. Even the top Marine in Iraq, Major General Stephen Johnson, has admitted,
"There will be no progress as long as the insurgents are not implicated in
a political process."(...) Against all odds, a national liberation front
is emerging in Iraq. Washington hawks may see it coming, but they certainly
don't want it. Many groups in this front have already met in Algiers. The front
is opposed to the American occupation and permanent Pentagon military bases;
opposed to the privatization and corporate looting of the Iraqi economy; and
opposed to the federation of Iraq, ie balkanization. Members of the front
clearly see through the plan of fueling sectarianism to provoke an atmosphere
of civil war, thus legitimizing the American presence. The George W Bush
administration's obsession in selling the notion that Iraqis - or "anti-Iraqi
forces", or "foreign militants" - are trying to start a civil
war in the eastern flank of the Arab nation is as ludicrous as the myth it
sells of the resistance as just a lunatic bunch of former Ba'athists and
Wahhabis.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GF10Ak03.html
Iraq
Exit strategy: Civil war - Asia Times
By Pepe Escobar
"In
reality, the electoral process was designed to legitimize the occupation,
rather than ridding the country of the occupation ... Anyone who sees himself
capable of bringing about political reform should go ahead and try, but my
belief is that the occupiers won't allow him." - Shi'ite
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
As Shi'ites and Kurds
fought for three months to come up with an Iraqi cabinet, it is emerging from
Baghdad that soon a broad front will emerge on the political scene composed of
politicians, religious leaders, clan and tribal sheikhs - basically Sunni but
with Shi'ite participation - with a single-minded agenda: the end of the US-led
occupation.
This front will
include, among others, what we have termed the Sinn Fein component of the
resistance, the powerful Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) and the
Sadrists. It will refuse any kind of dialogue with new Prime Minister Ibrahim
Jaafari and his government unless there's a definite timetable for the complete
withdrawal of the occupation forces. Even the top Marine in Iraq, Major General
Stephen Johnson, has admitted, "There will be no progress as long as the
insurgents are not implicated in a political process."
But the proliferation
of what many moderate Sunnis and Shi'ites suspect as being Pentagon-organized
black ops is putting the emergence of this front in jeopardy. This is obvious
when we see Harith al-Dhari - the AMS leader - blaming the Badr Brigades (the
armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution - SCIRI - in Iraq, a
major partner in the government) for the killing of Sunni Arab clerics.
Breaking
up Iraq
Several Iranian
websites have widely reported a plan to break up Iraq into three Shi'ite southern
mini-states, two Kurdish mini-states and one Sunni mini-state - with Baghdad as
the seat of a federal government. Each mini-state would be in charge of law and
order and the economy within its own borders, with Baghdad in charge of foreign
policy and military coordination. The plan was allegedly conceived by David
Philip, a former White House adviser working for the American Foreign Policy
Council (AFPC). The AFPC is financed by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation,
which has also funded both the ultra-hawkish Project for a New American Century
and American Enterprise Institute.
The plan would be
"sold" under the admission that the recently elected,
Shi'ite-dominated Jaafari government is incapable of controlling Iraq and
bringing the Sunni Arab guerrillas to the negotiating table. More
significantly, the plan is an exact replica of an extreme right-wing Israeli
plan to balkanize Iraq - an essential part of the balkanization of the whole
Middle East. Curiously, Henry Kissinger was selling the same idea even before
the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Once again this is
classic divide and rule: the objective is the perpetuation of Arab disunity.
Call it Iraqification; what it actually means is sectarian fever translated
into civil war. Operation Lightning - the highly publicized counter-insurgency
tour de force with its 40,000 mostly Shi'ite troops rounding up Sunni Arabs -
can be read as the first salvo of the civil war. Vice President Dick Cheney all
but admitted the whole plan on CNN, confidently predicting that "the
fighting will end before the Bush administration leaves office".
But the destiny
awaiting this counter-insurgency may be best evaluated by comparing it to Gillo
Pontecorvo's 1966 classic, The Battle of Algiers - one of the most influential
political films ever, and supposedly a "must see" at the Pentagon.
The French in Algeria in the early 1960s did indeed break the back of the
guerrillas - but in the end lost the Algerian war. Talking about Vietnamization
- the precursor to Iraqification - the Vietcong's Tet offensive in 1968 was
lethal, but the counter-insurgency - Operation Phoenix - was even more lethal.
In the end, though, the US also lost the war.
There's no Operation Phoenix going on in Iraq. The US has little "humint" (human intelligence), so it is incapable of penetrating the complex resistance tribal net - and not only because of its